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ABSTRACT 
The small satellite BIRD has successfully demonstrated 
the combination of ambitious science and innovative but 
not necessarily space-proven components in design to 
cost. BIRD’s payload is still fully functional. Its 
pointing accuracy depends on the still working attitude 
control components. Future missions based on BIRD 
experience and design are planned. We suggest a 
continued on-demand use of BIRD as a test bed for their 
development. New algorithms and strategies can be 
tested on BIRD by software upload before taking risks 
on its successors. Magnetorquer attitude control can be 
tested and improved. The long time behaviour of the 
battery stacks and electronics will be evaluated. Non-
propulsive orbit control techniques can be evaluated and 
tested in conjunction with atmospheric measurements. 
 
1. CURRENT SITUATION 
1.1. Administrative Circumstances 
 
 The operational end of life of DLR’s very successful 
small fire-detection satellite, BIRD, has again been 
announced for the end of 2007. This end, after the 
previous cut of dedicated funding several years ago, was 
due to the several years of severely impaired pointing 
ability of the satellite. With the loss of the satellite’s 
operationally useful pointing capabilities, this 
announced end appears reasonable, despite the still fully 
functioning payload. 
 However, with the widespread use of BIRD technology 
for two new series of DLR satellites and potentially 
others, a new operational factor has arisen which merits 
a reconsideration of the decision to ground BIRD at the 
end of last year. The driving programmes using 
technology first established in the BIRD effort are the 
DLR Agentur’s OOV/TET (On-Orbit Verification / 
Technologieerprobungsträger) programme which 
intends to provide an orbital bus for collections of 
various technological and engineering experiments, and 
DLR’s own new SSB (Standard Satellite Bus) platform 
intended to provide easy and cost-efficient access to 
orbit for dedicated payloads proposed or lead by the 
scientific community within DLR. The first models of 
these series are in phase CD and phase A, with launches 
intended in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
 
1.2. On-board Technical and Ground Segment 
Operational Status 
 
 BIRD operations have in recent years only been 
maintained through a skilful and serendipitous 
combination of personal and institutional efforts. These 
include housekeeping data harvesting for the OOV/TET 
development effort, engineering interest in the long-
term behaviour of infrared sensors and mechanical 
coolers within the payload, and most of all, personal 
interest and tenacity combined with the willingness to 
try data takes at very low chances of full success and 
non-negligible risk to flight hardware on the part of the 
last ground staff assigned to BIRD satellite operations, 
aided by the need to track objects on the verge of 
becoming space debris. The in-house study of late 2006 
from which this document has been developed 
represents the first dedicated involvement of the SSB 
effort in the reuse of BIRD and its engineering data.  
 
 As of 2008 Apr 24, and based on day-to-day ground 
operator experience, BIRD suffers from at least the 
following critical failures and design flaws: 
 
- Of the eight common pressure vessel batteries each 
containing two cells, at least two cells are weak. Great 
operational care is required to avoid cell reversal in 
these two aged cells that would lead to their quick 
destruction. By design, there are no sufficient indicators 
implemented in flight hardware to enable full individual 
monitoring of each common pressure vessel element, let 
alone of each cell. Power management planning is 
entirely dependent on operator experience to interpret 
the information available from the few sensors 
available, some of which have drifted considerably, 
even out of range. Also, the design of the power 
converters does not allow for a deep discharge of the 
battery, leading to a conservative safe mode trigger 
level battery voltage. This level is reached quickly after 
the failure of very few cells of the battery even if all 
others remain in good condition. 
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 - Of the four reaction wheels installed on board, two are 
considered dead. The third wheel may still have a 
probably very limited capability, combined with a 
quality problem that is mechanical and/or command 
interface induced, but has not been tested thoroughly 
enough to determine the most likely cause of failure; it 
also has not been switched on for a long time. The last 
wheel is possibly still available and may not have 
suffered mechanical damage, but has also remained 
essentially untested for a long time. Mechanical 
problems in the wheels were originally caused by a 
failure of the on-board flight control and wheel 
controller hardware and software to intercept commands 
that lead to spin rates way beyond the mechanical wheel 
design’s capabilities. A late budgetary decision to use 
unsuitable low-grade material wheel bearings reduced 
these mechanical capabilities substantially and likely 
contributed to the mechanical effects of the failures. 
Another contribution may have come from coil resin 
that has moved out of the wheel motors due to 
mobilization by excessive heating during this event. 
 
- The firmware (internal software) of the star trackers 
can not be updated. The flight release firmware suffers 
from two serious problems. Most importantly, the 
firmware crashes when internal interrupts caused by 
data transfer requests from the outside occur at a point 
in time inconvenient to the firmware. The time windows 
of communication convenient to the firmware are 
known, but since the quartz clocks of the star trackers 
and the main computers are not synchronized, the 
timing will always diverge over time. The relative time 
difference and its rate are not known and can not be 
estimated. The time difference will accumulate to a 
critical level within very few days. Recovery from these 
failures requires a full reset and restart of the star 
trackers. Since an automated mechanism such as a 
periodical reset of the star trackers is not implemented 
in the current flight software, they are not in the attitude 
control loop and are used only to reference captured 
images. Also, misleading data occasionally appear in 
the output when the dark sky is occulted by the Earth, 
the Moon, or other bright images such as internal 
reflexes caused by the optical surfaces. 
 
- The sun sensors are installed such that one of their 
three dual redundant orthogonal photocells is in parallel 
with the deployed solar panels. The attempt to point the 
satellite for maximum power input at the Sun causes 
sunlight to shine at a near 90° angle of incidence on 
these photocells, and grazing on all others. The cosine 
shape of the signal per photocell causes the well lit cell 
to be insensitive to attitude changes, while the low level 
of light on all others causes them to be very sensitive for 
sources of light other than the Sun. The resulting error 
of the indicated direction to the Sun can easily exceed 
20° at certain parts of the orbit. This deviation does not 
correspond to the direction to the equivalent effective 
point source of radiation integrated over the hemisphere 
visible to the photovoltaic cells on the solar panels. It is 
also unpredictable because a major contribution arises 
from albedo differences on Earth, such as cloud 
patterns. Both effects cause a drop in solar power input 
that due to the aged batteries and solar panels has 
become operationally relevant. 
 
- Payload data can only be stored in volatile memory 
within the payload data handling unit which does not 
support a low power data retention mode. Hence, data 
takes can only be attempted when the power situation 
does not force the satellite into safe mode before the 
data have been downlinked and the payload data 
handling has been shut down in a controlled fashion. 
 
- Magnetometer and GPS data are not used sufficiently 
by the on-board attitude control software to augment 
attitude information to provide a vector other than the 
sun vector for true three-axial attitude control. 
 
- The IMU is no longer available after a relatively early 
failure, although it has exceeded its design life. 
 
 
 Due to the termination of dedicated funding, only one 
pass per day is presently used for ground contact 
activities. The power situation has to be evaluated from 
pass to pass. It is highly dependent on the random 
orientation with which the satellite comes out of eclipse. 
Although the magnetorquer-only attitude actuation 
regime is capable of roll rates of 90° in 10 minutes, the 
time it takes to re-orient the satellite fully towards the 
Sun is significant with respect to the total time of 
insolation per orbit. 
 The error of the sun vector generated by the sun sensors 
depends not only on ephemeral patterns such as cloud 
cover and surface albedo on Earth, but also on 
reflections of these from the satellite that emanate from 
surfaces able to produce glints and flares. It is not 
possible to separate solar radiation from any of the other 
sources. Because there is no solar input to the sun 
sensors while in eclipse, the residual drift accumulates 
during this period and counteraction only begins at 
satellite sunrise. This induces a step response behaviour 
at the beginning of insolation and every time the sun 
vector is reacquired. The variability of secondary 
sources of light and their modification by directly 
attitude dependent reflections induces additional time-
variable errors that can also excite oscillations of the 
attitude control system. At times, these oscillations 
grow so much that data takes become impossible for 
lack of power. The behaviour of these oscillations is not 
well understood and may well remain entirely 
unpredictable for the purpose of mission planning 
 because of the contribution by factors such as cloud 
cover. 
 
 Although BIRD is three-axis stabilized by design, and 
even by the sensors and actuators still available, the 
satellite is hence effectively in a tumbling roll 
stabilization. The roll axis, the Sun vector, and the solar 
panel normal frequently but not always come to drift 
within a common cone half angle of some 20°. 
 
 When data takes are attempted, the roll about the 
perceived sun vector causes the line sensors of the 
payload cameras to be at a random and unknown 
orientation with respect to the direction of motion and 
the ground track. This orientation is constrained only by 
the very general limits resulting from a power situation 
deemed sufficient for imaging, and the previous attitude 
control behaviour and stability required to achieve it. 
Depending on the deviation of the sensor line from a 
right angle to the direction of motion considered 
acceptable, the imagery acquired has a fairly low chance 
of being useable in general. Since the orientation of the 
perceived sun vector deviates in two dimensions, the 
chance of actually hitting a target area on the ground is 
much lower again. 
 Values given based on the requirements of operators 
used to non-small satellites for these chances are on the 
order of 5 % and 0.01 %, respectively. The chances of 
achieving generally useable imagery imply the 
definition of a required angle between the line sensors 
and the direction of motion of > 85°. The definition of a 
required general pointing error may be estimated by 
assuming that the surface of the Earth is hit at all, taking 
into account BIRD’s initial orbital altitude of 572 km. 
This would imply an error of < 5° along track and 
across track required to hit a square target area, or < 
0°.25 across track required for sufficient coverage of an 
infinite length swath. The latter values correspond to 
approximately one quarter and one seventieth, 
respectively, of the nominal swath width of BIRD. 
While the first value would seem very relaxed for an 
operational requirement, the latter seems typical for the 
high quality standards previously achieved in other 
Earth observation programmes. Experience shows that 
sometimes, indeed, the horizon is well visible in the 
image product, and the pointing error that still can be 
achieved by BIRD may consequentially be even larger. 
 
2. TESTABILITY 
Currently, the resources for close to real life simulations 
and testing available to satellite development efforts are 
very limited both in scope and number, and yet, very 
expensive. For small satellites, the common budgetary 
constraints further restrict the technological envelope of 
testing resources, and even those options readily 
available to financially larger projects may not be 
available at all.  
 Many crucial operational factors, such as radiation 
exposure and the effects of prolonged weightlessness, 
meaning that which lasts longer than about five seconds, 
remain virtually untestable on the ground, regardless of 
the financial effort. For the possible failures in the 
estimation of consequences of these factors, the launch 
of a satellite possibly worth hundreds of millions of 
euros still is nothing but a huge leap of faith, despite the 
experience accumulated in fifty years of space flight. 
 Ideal testing would include factors as these, and 
provide reliable data by simulating over time scales of 
at least the same order of magnitude as that expected as 
a reasonable functional lifetime of the satellite to be 
launched. Of course it is impossible to achieve this, 
especially in the one-off world of European science 
payloads, for it would mean to launch a test craft for 
every operational spacecraft. 
 
 But still, this approach has been used widely. All 
procedures to be uploaded to the Voyager 2 spacecraft 
for its highly successful Uranus and Neptune encounters 
were implemented and rigorously tested on Voyager 1 
which was headed to empty space after its close 
encounter with Saturn’s moon, Titan. These procedures 
included extremely risky endeavours such as out-of-
spec operation of the hydrazine thruster engines or the 
disengagement of the second redundant computer to 
free up computational capacity for image compression, 
which had not yet been invented when these probes 
were launched. Indeed, both spacecraft were across the 
board driven to performances way beyond their pre-
launch specifications. Their successful operation beyond 
Saturn would not have been possible without the use of 
Voyager 1 as a mission-identical test-bed. [1] Similar 
methods were used on several less well known 
spacecraft series, such as those based on the American 
Agena and (former) Soviet Zenit platforms. Both were 
highly serialized spacecraft buses, and sometimes, 
several operationally decommissioned spacecraft were 
still available in orbit at a time. [2][3] 
 
 Now, for the first time outside the U.S. and the former 
Soviet Union (and possibly China), there arises the 
opportunity to have a conceptually and in many 
functions nearly identical test bed in a real space 
environment. It would also be fully available around the 
clock to the mission design teams concerned, and in 
hardware, it is already paid for. 
 
3. PRODUCTIVITY INCREASE BY NEW USE 
Propagations of BIRD’s orbit over the range of solar 
activity to be expected until mid-2016 show that it is 
very likely to survive in orbit until late 2010 even under 
expected worst case conditions. These would be 
effected by the highest expected, +3σ prediction of the 
2011/12 solar maximum hitting BIRD’s full 
aerodynamic cross section, by ways of radiation-
 induced expansion of the upper atmosphere. Careful 
attitude management could extend BIRD’s time until re-
entry by about two to three years even under the most 
adverse solar conditions, and luck, in the shape of lower 
than maximum estimated solar activity may easily see 
BIRD through to mid-2016 and beyond. This is longer 
than the longest requested lifetime of any payload 
presently under consideration for a SSB launch in 2011, 
and most likely covers at least the initial phases of 
flights to come. 
 
3.1. Ambitious Theory and Humble Practice 
 
 BIRD, and its bus components in particular, could thus 
in theory stand ready to serve as a testbed for new 
mission software for all subsequent flights based on its 
technology. Temporary loss of BIRD due to a 
malfunctioning software experiment may be more easily 
tolerable than the same occurring to an operational TET 
or SSB spacecraft. 
 
 In practice, however, several important factors would 
have to be met first. Most critical is the power situation. 
As long as the present situation of two weak battery 
cells continues, near normal operation would be 
possible if battery charging could be achieved reliably, 
and the time between image taking and downlink were 
short enough. However, the unreliable attitude control 
presently causes an equal lack of reliability in solar 
panel pointing. Since payload power can only be drawn 
from the surplus beyond the needs of vital functions, it 
is essential to expand this margin. 
 A first step to enable reuse of BIRD has to be the 
development of a new attitude control and star tracker 
management software suite that integrates all available 
information into the control loop; continuous star 
tracking with occultation filtering and periodical timing 
management also to replace the IMU, GPS localization, 
magnetometer data, and sun sensor information. On the 
actuator side, the availability and condition of the 
wheels would have to be assessed once a reliable 
magnetorquer-only recovery has become possible. If at 
least one wheel remains operative, it may be used. If 
not, and to ward against further failures of these aged 
components, an optimized magnetorquer-only actuation 
mode has to be included. The use of the magnetorquers 
to maintain the satellite’s attitude at an improved 
precision will most likely require practice and fine 
tuning of control loop parameters. The total effort for 
this is probably comparable to a new software 
development of a similar scale in the present TET or 
SSB efforts. If this is correct, it would still be an order 
of magnitude cheaper than the development of a new 
satellite for the same purpose as BIRD. 
 Imaging does not necessarily require nadir pointing 
which reduces the power input from the solar cells at the 
most critical time of demand. If a reduced resolution can 
be accepted by stepping down from the very high 
quality levels usually required by operators and 
customers of non-small satellites, slant imaging 
becomes possible. The satellite will then scan the 
ground without departing from its attitude of optimal 
insolation. In return, the ground resolution drops 
according to the increased distance to the area imaged, 
but this area also grows in exchange, yielding the same 
number of pixels. Slant projections of the field of view 
onto the globe will require additional postprocessing 
and unstretching of the image content, but this effort is 
very small compared to that of developing a new 
satellite. Similar software is used to map and mosaic 
flyby images of interplanetary probes with fields of 
view extending to the local horizon of the celestial 
bodies photographed from close range. 
 
 A new critical situation will then only arise if more 
battery cells become weak, or if more than two of the 
still healthy or weak battery cells fail completely by 
internal short circuit, or if one battery cell fails by open 
circuit. The limit for the number of weak cells is set by 
the low battery voltage trigger level that causes the 
satellite to switch into safe mode. It is not clear whether 
this limit can be readjusted or ignored, hence it is 
assumed as fixed. Once the limit of weak or shortened 
battery cells is exceeded, a safe mode will occur every 
time the satellite passes into eclipse. It may be possible 
to handle even this situation if a fast bootstrapping 
process can be implemented in the software to be 
uploaded, and some measure of data retention is 
possible. The satellite would then have to wake up at 
every sunrise, if necessary get its position and epoch by 
GPS, and follow a preset per-orbit routine as long as it 
is in daylight. It may also be sent to sleep in a controlled 
fashion, by reducing the roll rates as far as possible 
before sunset, to increase the likelihood of good solar 
panel pointing at sunrise despite the unconscious drift 
period in eclipse. Thermal conditioning may become a 
part of this day and night routine, as well, by controlled 
preheating of critical systems while in daylight to 
compensate for the uncontrolled coldsoaking in eclipse. 
 Successful camera payload operation becomes very 
unlikely in this regime because image taking and 
downlinking would have to occur within one period of 
insolation, but it would not be entirely impossible. 
Windows of availability would be restricted to orbits 
and target areas with a suitable S-band ground station, 
each, uprange from the area to be imaged for 
commanding image takes, and downrange for dumping 
image data. 
 The most likely use in the situation of effective loss of 
the battery would involve the collection of 
housekeeping data on a few suitable orbits and passes 
from time to time, and magnetorquer attitude control 
experiments or practice. 
 
  Activities using BIRD even in a very restricted fashion 
will end once the solar panels no longer develop 
sufficient charging power to lift the degraded battery 
stack above the safe mode threshold voltage. This will 
occur if several battery cells develop hard shorts instead 
of just becoming weak cells. Until then, using BIRD is a 
matter of informed decision, not technical fate. 
 
3.2. Potential Gain 
 
 The main benefits differ for the SSB payloads presently 
under consideration, but all can easily benefit from a 
suitable extension of BIRD’s mission. These benefits 
can be reaped before launch during the design and 
construction phases, as well as after launch during 
commissioning and operations, and most of all, for 
trouble-shooting at all times - assuming that BIRD can 
be made available as suggested above. 
 
3.2.1. AsteroidFinder/SSB 
 
 The experience gained by BIRD’s exposure to a higher 
and growing lifetime radiation dose can extend the 
upper limit of the orbit altitude envelope for SSB 
satellites. It is presently still that set for BIRD before its 
launch in 2001, at 850 km with regular excursions to 
about 900 km allowed if caused by an eccentricity of no 
more than 0.03. The extension of the upper limit would 
allow for higher and better illuminated Sun-synchronus 
dawn-dusk orbits, and for less interference in limb-
grazing observations of near-Sun asteroids from a more 
frequently available 10..11:00 SSO. The combination of 
BIRD’s radiation hardness and orbital decay data may 
further the optimization of the initial orbital altitude in a 
way to ensure a very long orbital life at a minimum 
radiation dose. By this, the payload could benefit from 
its inherent potential of low risk due to mechanical 
failures. It could well outlast several solar maxima in an 
operationally useful state for long-term observations. 
Also, the number and variety of the secondary payload 
launch opportunities available to this payload may rise 
considerably with the clearer definition of the range in 
initial orbital altitudes. 
 BIRD’s aged avionics and the upcoming rise in solar 
activity from its present minimum to the next maximum 
expected in 2011/12 will provide the opportunity to gain 
the experience necessary to build even more reliable 
single event upset recovery procedures. These can be 
tested in a real environment, and may thus immediately 
extend the SSB’s safe envelope of operations yet again, 
even for missions already under way. This further 
relaxes launcher constraints, and it expands the field of 
payloads that can be acquired for flights on a SSB. 
 
 However, BIRD has so far proven fairly insensitive to 
the most commonly cited source of radiation-related 
single event upsets in small satellites, the South Atlantic 
Anomaly (SAA). [4][5] Earlier preliminary analyses of 
the geographical location of these upsets in BIRD do 
not show the SAA at all in data from the first 36 days of 
2003. There seems to be a slightly higher density of 
upsets near the northern aurora oval, and near mid 
latitudes. [6] If this trend were to continue during the 
upcoming rise in solar activity, the desired radiation 
sensitivity data would remain largely elusive. It may 
then still be stated that the radiation protection strategies 
used in the development of BIRD were effective, and 
that small satellites do not necessarily have to be overly 
sensitive to a typical low Earth orbit space radiation 
environment. 
 
 If an active cooling scheme has to be employed for the 
focal plane array on AsteroidFinder, one of the options 
is the use of Stirling cycle coolers similar to those used 
on BIRD. Continued operation of these coolers on 
BIRD will provide an extended base of data for 
reliability calculations, and may also highlight the first 
points of failure in operation to focus efforts to improve 
the design of mechanisms used.  
 
3.2.2. CHARM/SSB 
 
 Unlike the other SSB payloads under discussion, 
CHARM benefits exclusively from an as low as 
possible orbit. At the same time, the payload is likely to 
impose strong constraints on the attitude of the satellite. 
During the solar maximum of 2011 and thereafter, the 
atmosphere will expand with the growing intensity of 
the Sun’s radiation. Its influence will therefore reach to 
higher altitudes, including the lower portion of the 
SSB’s envelope of orbital altitudes. A high quality 
characterization of the atmospheric and radiative drag 
effects on a SSB-type satellite is therefore highly 
desirable, including the effects of aged surfaces. 
Detailed knowledge of the effects on BIRD’s orbital 
altitude and on the loading of the attitude control system 
in particular are vital for the planning of CHARM’s 
observations since an orbit trim propulsion is presently 
not available on the SSB. CHARM’s orbit will therefore 
with its continuous decay alternate between highly 
repetitive and highly non-repetitive modes of ground 
coverage. If other constraints require an intermittent 
mode of operation of its high-power Differential 
Absorption LIDAR (DIAL) payload, a tight prediction 
of the orbit will provide a clear indication as for the 
choice of the most favourable scheduling of operations. 
BIRD will most likely lead CHARM in its orbital decay 
by a margin useful for continuous mission planning. 
This will be the case for almost all scenarios except for 
an extremely weak solar maximum combined with the 
strict implementation of an altitude-saving attitude 
mode on BIRD’s side, and hence, a lower initial orbit 
altitude of CHARM when launched on time in 2011. 
 
 3.2.3. LiveSat/SSB 
 
 A major fraction of LiveSat’s sub-payloads requires 
exposure to space radiation. By the same mechanisms as 
described for AsteroidFinder, but for the diverging 
requirements of the highest radiation dose at a short 
lifetime, an intentional launch into a more intense 
radiation environment may become feasible if the SSB’s 
survivable dose is raised by BIRD’s experience to be 
gained. BIRD has so far performed extremely well 
during several intense solar storms, some of which were 
strong enough to seriously upset other satellites built 
exclusively from space-qualified and radiation-hardened 
parts, unlike BIRD. Experience from at least two serious 
breakdowns early in BIRD’s mission has been 
incorporated into the on-board software and ground 
operations, and the existing data may again be analyzed 
to learn even more lessons. 
 It may be possible to implement a regular temporary 
shut-down routine in LiveSat/SSB to reduce the risk of 
single event upsets while the satellite passes through 
high-radiation zones at apogee, or within the South 
Atlantic Anomaly. This would be similar to the sunrise 
bootstrap and controlled shutdown mechanisms 
discussed earlier, and should be tested extensively, 
because recovery to normal operations has to occur 
reliably after the risk-inducing exposure. These tests are 
only possible in the real environment, using BIRD. 
 
 On the other hand, it may be possible to implement a 
non-propulsive orbital decay and re-entry control 
regime, if LiveSat/SSB was to be launched to a fairly 
low orbit to increase the re-entry capsule’s efficiency by 
decreasing its propellant mass fraction. If the satellite 
was intentionally allowed to decay naturally to a very 
low Earth orbit, below approximately 180 km before 
separating the re-entry capsule, a substantial increase in 
scientific payload could be achieved by reducing the 
size of the de-orbit motor. The variable forces necessary 
to control the descent can be provided by modulating 
atmospheric and radiative drag by changing the 
satellite’s attitude relative to the direction of orbital 
motion and the Sun, respectively. Although it is 
impossible to achieve a set date for re-entry, a control 
margin seems to exist for every timescale concerned if 
the satellite’s cross section is at least as variable as that 
of the present TET envelope viewed from all aspects. 
 Also, experimental use of the magnetorquer coils as 
magnetosails to generate a very low thrust may be 
possible. This method of propulsion is discussed for 
interplanetary spaceflight, but seems also useable within 
strong magnetospheres. If a measurable effect could be 
produced using a small satellite, this would be 
significant in that surplus power may be even used for 
minute changes in the orbit. If the effect were 
measurable, its control could be exercised. 
 Both mechanisms can be tested and quantified in the 
real world, using BIRD. In fact, if it were to last long 
enough, BIRD’s re-entry may be used as a 
demonstration, and for studies in conjunction with 
ground-based observations by a meteorite tracking 
network, such as the European fireball network operated 
in part by DLR (PF BA). 
 
 For LiveSat/SSB, both approaches may be combined in 
a high-eccentricity orbit, if it were available as a launch 
option. 
 
 The complex payload arrangement of LiveSat will 
require a very intense flow of payload, bus, and pointing 
commands, some of which are to be sent via 
independent links by third parties, such as DLR’s 
School Lab. This mode of operation will require 
extensive testing of these mechanisms and safe recovery 
methods. The latter will have to include emergency 
pointing and reaction wheel unloading through the 
magnetorquers. The latter are still available on BIRD, 
but their use requires considerable attitude control and 
mission design experience. BIRD can provide the 
necessary set-up for sustained proficiency training of 
personnel to be involved in the operation of future SSB 
and TET satellites, and for the fine tuning of automatic 
mechanisms which will have to work reliably beyond 
the reach of ground control networks. 
 
3.2.4. BIRD 
 
 Apart from in many ways serving as a very useful 
retro-SSB test-bed, or indeed retro-TET just as well, 
there are also intrinsic benefits that can be gained by a 
continued availability of BIRD. The past European, 
Californian, and Australo-Asian fire seasons have yet 
again demonstrated the value of information provided 
by means similar to BIRD’s infrared payload. 
 Although continued expenses for a continuous 
operation seem unwarranted due to the precarious 
attitude control situation, the option to quickly 
reactivate the satellite to an operational status in case of 
emergency has to be kept alive and imprved upon in the 
ways mentioned earlier, for several reasons: 
 
 First, there is continued interest in several BIRD 
follow-on concepts, including several entries in the 
competition leading to the selection of the three SSB 
payloads selected for phase 0 studies mentioned above. 
However, while a generally available but presently 
unreliable, yet powerful route of information still 
generates interest in the time pressure of a major 
disaster management situation, a proposal for future 
missions will not. Hence, even if BIRD due to its 
present or improved condition fails more often than not 
to provide overhead imagery of the disaster area, it will 
still be included in the effort and in the post-situation 
 assessments by trying alone. Any successful imaging, 
even at greatly reduced resolution, will still surpass that 
presently available from other satellites. It will also 
provide instant relief, and opportunity for publicity, 
while the demand to improve the reliability and quality 
of this service in case of intermittent failure to image the 
target area will provide a well documented incentive to 
follow up on follow-on missions. Temporary 
unavailability may by the contrast of the sorely missed 
item actually be a promotional factor for future fire 
detection missions. 
 
 Then, if these follow-on missions come to pass, the 
continued monitoring of the performance of critical 
components aboard BIRD will increase the 
experimentally proven reliability of those, and the 
design approach itself. Prolonged experience in the 
operation of mechanical components such as the active 
payload coolers, or the semiconductor sensors, and data 
on their wear and ageing in a real space environment 
will be valuable to any new design. Since a low altitude 
orbit offers benefits for many Earth observation 
technologies, the extension of these data to very low 
altitudes will be useful. Of interest is the specific 
environment of the lower ionosphere with its high 
ionized atomic oxygen component, as well as a higher 
total dose of radiation. Both can be provided at the same 
time by BIRD, due to its natural orbital decay and the 
latter’s coincidence with the upcoming solar maximum. 
 
 Finally, permanently shutting down a satellite payload 
which observes effects of interest for human-induced 
climate change, biodiversity issues, and ecological 
research in general, simply is bad publicity. Continued 
operation even at a low level of intensity will provide a 
data bridge over time for future missions and scientific 
studies. 
 
3.2.5. Others 
 
 If it survives in a condition that would still allow for 
attitude control, the final phase of BIRD’s orbital decay 
could also be used to try out a non-propulsive re-entry 
control technique that may be applicable for all satellites 
with an at least partially working attitude control 
system. As mentioned above, initial testing of the 
available mechanisms, drag modulation and 
magnetospheric magnetosailing, can be done some time 
before BIRD’s final decay phase. The data generated 
would directly be applicable for the TET and SSB 
efforts. 
 However, the principle has a wider use in the de-
orbiting of numerous small, low density, as well as rare 
heavy, high-density satellites. The natural decay of the 
growing number of small satellites without a propulsion 
system could be speeded up, reducing the number of 
targets for the generation of orbital debris avalanche 
growth. For larger satellites, the amount of propellant to 
be reserved for de-orbiting may be reduced if other 
force-generating mechanisms are available and proven. 
Also, the risk posed to the ISS by any one satellite 
without a propulsion system while being at the same 
altitudes with crossing orbits can be reduced, if this 
altitude band is passed quickly in a controlled high-drag 
mode. Coordination with NORAD, ESA, and other 
space debris tracking efforts may be possible, and the 
published data be used to reduce the risk for the satellite 
concerned to collide with uncontrolled space debris by 
inducing a different rate of orbital decay. 
 
 The effects attainable by these low-thrust, low-drag 
methods may be small, but they may reach a useful 
order of magnitude if accumulated over time or used 
when most efficient. The variation of drag may be just 
large enough as a force difference at very low altitudes 
to within the last few days or weeks shift the predicted 
most likely point of re-entry away from high-risk areas 
such as the continents, to lower-risk areas. The latter 
include the Pacific-Atlantic common longitudes for 
high-inclination and sun-synchronous orbits, the Arctic 
Ocean, or Antarctica, and the circumantarctic parts of 
the major Oceans for mid-inclination orbits. In light of 
the recent successful satellite intercepts by ground-
based missiles, these mechanisms may also be used to 
trim the orbit so that favourable conditions exist at a 
missile range offering these services. 
 
 With variable drag forces, parameters sensitive to 
along-track variations can be trimmed, such as decay 
rate or eccentricity. By these, and given enough time to 
accumulate changes, the ground track and position at a 
point in time can be altered. Depending on the satellite 
orbit’s inclination, magnetic forces can also work in the 
cross-track and radial directions, while a substantial 
solar panel might allow the generation of lift as well as 
drag, the combined vector of which can be steered 
arbitrarily within a cone in the leeward hemisphere. 
Time-sequenced modulation of both drag and magnetic 
forces allows for quite sophisticated approaches. These 
might have sufficient efficiency to control a satellite’s 
re-entry within a relatively brief period around the re-
entry date progressively set by long-term variations in 
atmospheric drag due to solar activity while the satellite 
continues to decay naturally. 
 This is far from being a point landing control required 
for capsule recovery such as in LiveSat/SSB. At best, 
the most likely time and hence location of re-entry can 
be tuned within the greater frame of events imposed by 
the solar and atmospheric aspects of nature. However, 
this would be entirely satisfactory if the safest possible 
disposal of a satellite is the only requirement. This is of 
particular interest for satellites with high-density 
components such as large engines, heavy batteries, or 
X-ray mirrors, for example of the Wolter type used on 
 ROSAT. These are likely to survive re-entry, and may 
cause damage on the ground if they come down over 
inhabited areas. A functioning attitude control system 
may in this way be considered as a zero-mass secondary 
backup system. Over time, and after sufficient testing on 
other missions, this method may even develop into a 
replacement for dedicated de-orbiting equipment. It 
would require, and maybe become a technology driver 
for long term reliability in attitude control systems. This 
would also benefit many exotic future space missions 
for which this kind of reliability is essential. 
 
 The decaying orbit of such a satellite could in time be 
drag-modulated into a shape of some eccentricity that 
positions its perigee where a re-entry trajectory would 
lead into a safe area most of the times, at the most likely 
time of re-entry. This can be achieved by a high 
atmospheric drag orientation near the initial apogee to 
dip the perigee, a low drag attitude near the latter to 
maintain as much of the apogee altitude as possible, and 
the perigee if necessary. In other phases of the orbit, for 
example, a high solar radiation pressure attitude may be 
used to collect or dispose of a little orbital energy when 
necessary and not interfering with the aforementioned 
drag generation. Then, just before the final phase of re-
entry, the satellite could be turned into a minimum drag 
position to only just hold out until the Earth has turned 
the safe area to lie underneath the ground track, and 
then be switched to a maximum drag orientation to 
ensure re-entry within very few perigee passes. The 
accidental magnetosailing properties of the onboard 
harness and electronics may additionally be used in the 
same way, if the effect were substantial enough, or 
alternate cabling routes be incorporated into the harness 
to further these effects using bulk current from the main 
supplies to the main consumers. 
 
 Small satellites without components likely to survive 
re-entry as hazardous objects could in the same way be 
steered towards a designated re-entry are entirely 
without safety concerns. Then, their re-entry could be 
observed for scientific and other purposes. Examples are 
atmospheric studies, calibration experiments in 
meteoritics, re-entry engineering, and public relations 
fireworks extending over many hundreds of kilometres 
along track. Every satellite that is as closely tracked on 
its final days as it would be necessary for a satellite 
undergoing a semi-controlled re-entry in this way, 
inherently is a scientifically valuable probe for 
continuous studies of the upper atmosphere and its 
variability on short timescales. 
 
4. RETAINING BEST POSSIBLE USE OF AN 
INVESTMENT MADE WHILE AVOIDING 
ADDITIONAL EXPENSES 
A bare minimum tracking of BIRD will be required 
even after the end of all operations, due to the concerns 
about space debris. The only way to shorten the time 
and expenditures of this effort would be to speed up 
orbital decay by continuously exposing the maximum 
cross section of the satellite to atmospheric drag. This 
only becomes impossible with the end of all operations, 
be it for irrecoverable technical reasons as proposed, or 
by an earlier decision not related to such considerations. 
However, due to its orbit and mode of operation, BIRD 
already exposes a rather large cross section, and hence 
the gain available by this method is small; indeed, it 
may well be within the range of long-term modelling 
inaccuracies for several of the cases considered. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the option of continued use is 
retained, the time of availability can greatly be extended 
by choosing an attitude that with a minimum drag 
provides just enough power for the safely continued 
collection of engineering data on BIRD’s ageing. Since 
many of the people who designed and operated BIRD 
remain involved in the similar TET and SSB efforts, the 
only effort to be made to implement this proposal is to 
not dispose of all items necessary to operate BIRD in a 
full-on mode, be they communications and control 
hardware, software, or documentation. Especially 
critical is the BIRD-proprietary uplink equipment within 
the German network of ground stations for its non-
standard modulation, increased data rate command 
interface. 
 This non-effort may indeed constitute a saving in itself, 
as opposed to a regular decommissioning process. 
 
 With the above, it appears clearly recommendable that 
this non-effort be made. While it merely appears 
technologically sound and prudent from the engineer’s 
perspective, and will probably serve the public relations 
profile of DLR, it may in itself actually be a financially 
viable decision, too. 
 
5. METHODS 
The orbit predictions used herein are based on a simple 
satellite properties model using static and/or average 
attitudes and cross-sections with respect to the direction 
of motion in Earth orbit, and to the direction to the Sun, 
respectively. The individual simulation runs were 
started from BIRD’s present orbital altitude, calculated 
from a set of two-line elements as of 2007 Oct 15. 
BIRD’s effective mean operational atmospheric drag 
cross section was established by comparing the mean 
semi-major axis of simulation runs from launch on 2001 
Oct 22 at the epoch of the two-element set used with the 
actual value. Using identical solar-atmospheric 
conditions and drag coefficients for these runs, it was 
found that the actual atmospheric drag cross-section is 
about one tenth larger than calculated on the base of 
BIRD’s advertised capability and mode of operations. 
This increase most likely is due to a lower duty cycle of 
observations, and the resulting extension of the idle and 
 battery-charging attitude time. It may be inferred that 
BIRD decays faster because it is underused, as an 
unexpected surfacing of the paradigm use it or lose it. It 
is also noted that while this is true within the model, 
BIRD seems to decay slower than expected according to 
propagations made early in its operational life. The 
reason for this has not been investigated, but likely 
involves different models of solar activity. 
 The decay time to altitudes below 450 km is of special 
interest for the CHARM/SSB payload proposal. Decay 
dates beyond 2016 May 31 are coarsely estimated by 
typical dh/dt values taken from internal data of the 
decayed simulation runs for the respective activity 
expectation, i.e. assuming continued nominal or lowest 
expected activity beyond mid-2016. 
 
 The orbits were propagated using a dedicated mission 
analysis tool for low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, 
implementing a numerical orbit propagation based on a 
high accuracy force model. For the propagations to be 
completed within a reasonable time, the Earth’s gravity 
field was simulated to an order and degree of 20, only, 
with 2 to 120 being possible. Third-body perturbations 
due to the Sun and Moon, tidal forces of the Earth, and 
non-gravitational forces due to atmospheric drag, solar 
pressure, and geomagnetic forces are included in the 
model. The Jacchia-Gill Earth atmosphere model was 
used, and the effects of the possible variations of solar 
activity were included through solar flux tables of the 
actual activity and predictions, from 1994 Apr 01 to 
2016 May 31, also covering a five year SSB mission 
from mid-2011 onwards. These were provided for a 
minimum, nominal, and maximum prediction after the 
actual data until 2005 Jun 06 as of 2006 Sep 12, and 
from those scaleable by a user defined interpolation. 
Orbital and geometry parameters were generated in a 
file format suitable for direct analysis as well as 
automated plotting, using one-step-per-orbit runs. 
 
 Residual lifetime predictions are subject to a set of 
uncertainties. The major contributors to these are the 
actual, day-to-day, shorter time scales, and local 
variations of atmospheric density due to variations in 
the solar flux. Drag cross-section and coefficient may 
become additional major contributors once attitude 
control of the decaying object is lost. Even with these 
included, it has been shown in [7] that predictions of the 
residual lifetime of an uncontrolled object based on 
NORAD two-line elements, only, can be accurate to 
within about 10 % of the time to re-entry, if several 
atmospheric models can be used and the time to re-entry 
is within 0.5 to 10 days. Peak errors of the prediction 
can however rise up to about 25 % of the time until 
actual re-entry if only one model is used, or predictions 
are run on a very short time to re-entry. On an absolute 
scale, however, the predictions converge reliably 
enough for a closely monitored object. For the last 
orbits, high-percentage relative errors were mainly due 
to differences in altitude (±10 km) and time (±7 min) 
definitions of the reference time of re-entry becoming 
relevant. Ten days before re-entry, all models were on 
the safe side, within 0 to -2 days off, and three days 
prior to re-entry converging to within ±few orbits of the 
actual time of re-entry. This would be sufficient for an 
object to hit the largest albedo features of Earth if the 
re-entry is constrained along track by a sufficient 
eccentricity of the orbit and argument of perigee in the 
hours before actual re-entry. 
 Better results are likely possible for objects more 
closely monitored than a randomly chosen spent Vostok 
upper stage launched in 1978, on an in time sufficiently 
eccentricity-tuned orbit. 
 
6. DRAG MODULATION POTENTIAL OF A 
LARGE SATELLITE, ROSAT 
To gain an impression of their possible utility in a wider 
context, the methods used to estimate the orbital 
development of BIRD and the potential of drag 
modulation by attitude control as a non-propulsive tool 
for re-entry control may be applied to a large satellite. 
As an example without a propulsion system for re-entry 
control but with potential interest for a controlled or at 
least risk-reducing re-entry, the vintage German X-ray 
astronomy satellite, ROSAT, was chosen. Unlike for the 
satellites based on the BIRD concept discussed above, 
only the lower print-out time resolution propagation was 
run for a lifetime estimate, since the internal resolution 
of the propagation remains unchanged by the output file 
settings. The time difference in the results is of one 
orbital period plus one second, or less. This simplified 
approach has earlier been verified by comparison of 
various SSB propagation test runs. 
 The orbital lifetime estimate for ROSAT from an 
altitude of 200 km was derived by going backwards in 
the data record produced until reaching the last entry 
with an orbital altitude above 200 km. The actual 
altitude at this point was approximately within -0/+5 km 
of this value due to the lower resolution in time in the 
data files generated. The results given in the tables 
below were hence rounded in a way to make this 
difference inconsequential. 
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8. TABLES 
 
Solar maximum 
intensity until 2016 
May 31 
attitude mode aerodyn. / rad.  
cross-section, m² 
lower than 450 
km after, date 
altitude 
2016 May 
31, km 
approx. 
decay date 
highest expected max. drag 0.88  /  0.61 2Q 2010  4Q 2010 
highest expected operational avg. 0.58  /  0.85 4Q 2010  2Q 2011 
highest expected min. drag 0.30  /  0.61 4Q 2011  3Q 2013 
nominal expected max. drag 0.88  /  0.61 1Q 2011  4Q 2011 
nominal expected operational avg. 0.58  /  0.85 1Q 2012  2Q 2016 
nominal expected min. drag 0.30  /  0.61 3Q 2016 453 ~ 2020 
lowest expected max. drag 0.88  /  0.61 ~ 2022 483 ~ 2028 
lowest expected operational avg. 0.58  /  0.85 ~ 2025 499 ~ 2030 
lowest expected min. drag 0.30  /  0.61 > 2025 509 > 2030 
Table 1 - Rough estimates of BIRD’s orbital lifetime depending on attitude and solar activity 
 
 
 
 
Solar radiation intensity attitude mode aerodyn. / rad.  
cross-section, m² 
first time 
below 130 km 
after, d 
theoretical 
impact after, d 
highest expected maximum max. drag 1.16  /  0.41 0.1049 0.1361 
highest expected maximum mid drag side  0.41  /  1.16 0.3063 0.3493 
highest expected maximum min. drag 0.30  /  1.16 0.4056 0.4660 
lowest expected minimum max. drag 1.16  /  0.41 0.1625 0.1903 
lowest expected minimum mid drag side  0.41  /  1.16 0.4618 0.4917 
lowest expected minimum min. drag 0.30  /  1.16 0.6382 0.6625 
Table 2.1 - Drag modulation effect on immediate re-entry, SSB from near-circ. 150 km orbit 
 
 
Solar radiation intensity attitude mode aerodyn. / rad.  
cross-section, m² 
first time 
below 130 km 
after, d 
theoretical 
non-fragm. 
impact, d 
highest expected maximum max. drag 1.16  /  0.41 1.0806 1.1087 
highest expected maximum mid drag side  0.41  /  1.16 3.0658 3.1005 
highest expected maximum min. drag 0.30  /  1.16 4.1959 4.2276 
lowest expected minimum max. drag 1.16  /  0.41 2.3615 2.3789 
lowest expected minimum mid drag side  0.41  /  1.16 6.5926 6.6364 
lowest expected minimum min. drag 0.30  /  1.16 8.9788 9.0182 
Table 2.2 - Drag modulation effect on immediate re-entry, SSB circular 200 km orbit 
 parameter, variable, unit BIRD BIRD 
epoch of initial cond., YY/MM/DD.fod 01/10/22.2152 07/10/15.3537 
semi-major axis, A, km 6945.857 6904.8904398 
eccentricity, E, 1 0.001299 0.0016554 
argument of perigee, AOP, ° 210.026 15.0449 
mean anomaly, M, ° 0.00 345.1295 
right ascending node, RAAN, ° 8.177 48.0569 
inclination, I, ° 97.772 97.7497 
satellite mass, MASS, kg 92 92 
area, aerodynamic drag, AREA_CD, m² (calc. 0.53) from succ. approx.    0.58 
area, radiative drag, AREA_CR, m² 0.85 0.85 
aerodynamic drag coefficient, CD, 1 2.30000 2.30000 
radiative drag coefficient, CR, 1 1.30000 1.30000 
Table 3.1 - BIRD initial mean orbital elements and satellite drag parameters 
 
 
 
parameter, variable, unit SSB/TET 150 km SSB/TET 200 km 
epoch of initial cond., YY/MM/DD.fod 07/10/01 ; 11/01/01 07/10/01 ; 11/01/01 
semi-major axis, A, km 6528.000 6578.000 
eccentricity, E, 1 0.002277957 0.00 
argument of perigee, AOP, ° 90.00 270.0000 
mean anomaly, M, ° 0.00 180.0000 
right ascending node, RAAN, ° 96.8373 ; 191.1048 96.8373 ; 191.1048 
inclination, I, ° 96.1263 96.2936 
satellite mass, MASS, kg 110 110 
area, aerodynamic drag, AREA_CD, m² 0.30 ; 0.41 ; 1.16 0.30 ; 0.41 ; 1.16 
area, radiative drag, AREA_CR, m² 1.16 ; 1.16 ; 0.41 1.16 ; 1.16 ; 0.41 
aerodynamic drag coefficient, CD, 1 2.30000 2.30000 
radiative drag coefficient, CR, 1 1.30000 1.30000 
Table 3.2 - Re-entry control initial mean orbital elements and satellite drag parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
Solar maximum 
intensity until 2016 
May 31 
attitude mode aerodyn. / rad.  
cross-section, m² 
last time above 200 
km, days before re-
entry 
approximate decay 
date 
highest expected max. cross-sct. 20.00  /  11.90 1.16 4Q 2008 
highest expected side cross-sct. 10.71  /  11.90 1.80 3Q 2009 
highest expected min. cross-sct. 5.07  /  11.90 2.31 2Q 2010 
nominal expected max. cross-sct. 20.00  /  11.90 1.28 1Q 2009 
nominal expected side cross-sct. 10.71  /  11.90 1.41 4Q 2009 
nominal expected min. cross-sct. 5.07  /  11.90 3.21 4Q 2010 
lowest expected max. cross-sct. 20.00  /  11.90 1.80 1Q 2010 
lowest expected side cross-sct. 10.71  /  11.90 2.50 4Q 2010 
lowest expected min. cross-sct. 5.07  /  11.90 4.37 1Q 2013 
Table 4.1 - Rough estimates of ROSAT’s orbital lifetime and theoretical drag modulation effects depending on attitude 
and solar activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 parameter, variable, unit ROSAT, 401 km 
epoch of initial cond., YY/MM/DD.fod 07/10/22.5308 
semi-major axis, A, km 6779.911 
eccentricity, E, 1 0.0002108 
argument of perigee, AOP, ° 207.6211 
mean anomaly, M, ° 152.4687 
right ascending node, RAAN, ° 342.9523 
inclination, I, ° 52.9994 
satellite mass, MASS, kg 2421.10 
area, aerodynamic drag, AREA_CD, m² 5.07 ; 10.71 ; 20.00 
area, radiative drag, AREA_CR, m² 11.90 
aerodynamic drag coefficient, CD, 1 2.30000 
radiative drag coefficient, CR, 1 1.30000 
Table 4.2 - ROSAT initial mean orbital elements and estimated satellite drag parameters 
 
